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School of Social Work
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are among the
primary means for promoting reconciliation in communities re-
covering from violent conflict. However, there is a lack of consen-
sus about what reconciliation means or how it is best achieved.
In a qualitative study of the first TRC in the U.S., this research
interviewed victims of racial violence who participated in the
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission (GTRC),
a community-based restorative justice intervention. Findings
reveal that participants conceptualized reconciliation as a multi-
leveled process, that different concepts of reconciliation influ-
enced assessments of the success and limitations of the GTRC,
and indicate how community-based restorative interventions
can be improved to contribute to reconciliation in a local setting.
Key words: reconciliation, Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sions, restorative justice, victims, violence, post-conflict recon-
struction, peace building
Advocates of peace and nonviolence have long sought to
find solutions to the problems of war, violent conflict and op-
pression (Adams, 1991), from Jane Addams' peace activism
during WWI (Addams, 1922) to Gandhi's nonviolent revolu-
tion in India (Hiranandani, 2008). After the Nuremberg trials
following WWII, war crimes trials and tribunals became the
preferred means of addressing violence in the post-conflict
setting (Stover & Weinstein, 2004). However, the limitations
to implementing such trials include settings with an under-
developed rule of law, jurisdictional restrictions, and political
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compromises necessary to establish peace. Furthermore, trials
are not victim-centered and do not promote the reconciliation
of conflicting groups.
Addressing these shortcomings, restorative justice has
emerged as a field of theory and practice that seeks to repair
the social fabric that is damaged through violence (Braithwaite,
2002). Restorative justice has been applied to child welfare
(Adams & Chandler, 2004) criminal justice (Umbreit & Armour,
2011), and international conflict resolution and peace-mak-
ing (Beck, Kropf, & Leonard, 2011; Moore, 2004). Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are restorative justice-
based interventions that promote the social recovery from vio-
lence through reconciliation (Androff, 2010b). Originating in
Africa and Latin America, TRCs have been applied globally,
most famously in South Africa in the peaceful transition from
Apartheid to democracy (Hayner, 2001). The international
community, state actors and community activists have imple-
mented TRCs and other reconciliation interventions at interna-
tional, national and local levels, despite a lack of consensus on
reconciliation's meaning or how to best achieve it.
This study examines the first TRC to be applied in the U.S.,
a community-based restorative justice intervention that sought
to promote reconciliation in Greensboro, North Carolina after
decades of division and animosity following a 1979 incident
of racial violence. Through the perspectives of victims of the
violence that participated in the TRC, this research seeks to un-
derstand reconciliation in a local, community-based context.
This study investigates: how victims' expectations, percep-
tions, and experiences with reconciliation reflect differing con-
ceptual understandings of reconciliation; how the Greensboro
TRC (GTRC) attempted to accomplish reconciliation; and the
limits of reconciliation in local settings. A better understand-
ing of what reconciliation means in a local U.S. context and the
successes and limitations of the TRC in achieving reconcilia-
tion will lead to improved interventions for promoting peace
and rebuilding communities recovering from violence.
Reconciliation
The Greensboro Truth & Reconciliation Commission
The Greensboro Massacre was an episode of racial vio-
lence that occurred on November 3, 1979 in Greensboro, North
Carolina (GTRC, 2006; Magarrell & Wesley, 2008). A racially
mixed group of labor and social justice activists with ties to
the Communist Worker's Party had been organizing for labor
rights in North Carolina. Members had gained union leader-
ship positions inside textile mills, and began to protest an in-
crease of Ku Klux Klan (KKK) activity in the state. Earlier in
1979, the KKK screened their recruitment film, Birth of a Nation,
in a community theatre and the activists protested outside
and burnt a confederate flag. Vowing revenge, the KKK and
members of the American Nazi Party made plans to attend a
future demonstration; provocative and violent rhetoric esca-
lated between the groups. The Greensboro Police Department
and the FBI had an informant in the KKK and knowledge that
the groups were arming themselves in preparation for the
demonstration, yet there was no law enforcement presence
on the day of the rally. On November 3, 1979, the demonstra-
tors held a social justice rally and community teach-in a low-
income, African American neighborhood in Greensboro that
was to culminate in a march. KKK and American Nazi Party
members arrived at the demonstration in a caravan, and a fight
broke out. The KKK and Nazis fired into the crowd, killing five
demonstrators and injuring ten more.
Afterwards, police arrested some victims and surveilled
others (Bermanzohn, 2003; GTRC, 2006; Waller, 2002). City
authorities prevented further protests, harassed the survi-
vors, and pressured the local media to portray the violence
as an equal shootout between two radical fringe groups, even
though only one side suffered casualties. The victims were
portrayed in the media as outside agitators without communi-
ty ties. Despite video footage of the shooting, the perpetrators
were acquitted in two criminal trials by all-white juries. The
District Attorney responsible for prosecuting the shooters was
hostile to the victims, and denied publically any difference
between killing communists in Vietnam and killing them in
the U.S. Distrust of the city government grew among the low-
income and African American residents, as many suspected
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that law enforcement agencies were complicit in the violence.
The fallout increased racial tensions and a climate of animos-
ity that negatively affected life in Greensboro (Wheaton, 1987).
The survivors dedicated themselves to pursuing justice
for the dead and the truth about the violence (Bermanzohn,
2003; Waller, 2002). In 1985 they won a federal civil suit against
the Greensboro Police Department and the perpetrators. The
settlement launched the Greensboro Justice Fund, a civil rights
organization promoting democracy and racial tolerance in the
U.S. South. One survivor founded the Beloved Community
Center, which advocates for criminal justice and education
reform, campaigns for the homeless, and has organized K-Mart
workers.
The idea of reinvestigating the Greensboro Massacre was
discussed at the 20th anniversary of the violence by survivors
and community leaders impressed by the success of the South
African TRC. With philanthropic funding and NGO consul-
tants, they decided to apply a similar model to Greensboro.
In 2004 the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(GTRC) was created with a mandate to examine the causes
and consequences of November, 3, 1979 and to promote dia-
logue and reconciliation. In an effort to ensure that the process
would be objective in its investigation and independent from
the victims, the organizers conducted an inclusive selection
process to choose the seven Commissioners that would lead
the GTRC.
While many of the participants in the GTRC were victims
and concerned community members, Greensboro police per-
sonnel, lawyers from the criminal trials, and a few of the per-
petrators came forward to participate (GTRC, 2006; Williams,
2009). The Mayor and the City Council of Greensboro de-
clined to participate and actually opposed the process, even
though all the African American City Council members voted
in favor of supporting the GTRC. Those who were opposed
to the GTRC, including the city administration, claimed that
Greensboro's racial problems were in the past and irrelevant
to contemporary life, and that focusing on old issues would
harm Greensboro's image. Further, the reaction of the wider
community was mixed; there was a lot of support in the form
of donations and volunteers, but many in Greensboro were
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confused by, ignorant or critical of the GTRC for being overly
focused upon the victims.
Without any governmental support, the grassroots GTRC
did not enjoy subpoena powers to compel the disclosure of
records or the testimony of individuals. The GTRC took vol-
untary statements from approximately 200 people, including
victims, perpetrators, and community members, and held three
public hearings on the events leading up to the violence, the
events of November 3, 1979, and the consequences of the vio-
lence. They consulted the records they could obtain, however,
many documents released under the Freedom of Information
Act were significantly redacted. The GTRC concluded in 2006
with the release of the Final Report, a comprehensive account
of their findings and recommendations for the community.
As an intervention, the GTRC faced significant constraints
of funding, time, and authority that limited the scope of its
work. Functioning as a grassroots community-based initia-
tive without governmental support, the GTRC operated on a
shoestring budget and with a small staff supported primarily
by volunteers. By design, the GTRC was a time-limited inter-
vention; the Commissioners were empanelled in 2004 and the
Final Report was released in 2006. While it accomplished a lot
in its two years, its work was also constrained by these time
limits. The third limit on the GTRC's functioning was the lack
of sanction and support from the City of Greensboro. In addi-
tion to the technical limitations of not having subpoena power
to compel participation and obtain records, this may have
harmed the appearance of the GTRC's legitimacy for some in
the Greensboro community and contributed to the relatively
low turnout of perpetrators that participated in the GTRC.
That the GTRC was organized and completed its work in the
face of these constraints is remarkable.
Reconciliation
Definitions of Reconciliation
Reconciliation is as popular a concept as it is unclear.
Connotations of social harmony have led to unrealistic ex-
pectations of friendly relationships between warring parties
(Kumar, 1999; Stover & Weinstein, 2004) and the goal of rec-
onciliation has been dismissed as an ephemeral and spiritual
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but impractical goal (Boraine, 2004; Tutu, 1999). Despite this
conceptual confusion, the term abounds in social science and
post-conflict projects around the world.
Reconciliation's etymology from Latin means 'coming to-
gether,' and its main usage has been theological (Boraine, 2004;
Kumar, 1999; Minow, 1998; Tutu, 1999). Most definitions of
reconciliation in post-conflict settings involve communication
and mutual tolerance between opposing groups (Minow, 1998).
Reconciliation has been defined as the "mutually conciliatory
accommodation between antagonistic or formerly antagonis-
tic persons or groups" (Kriesberg, 2007, p. 2), where each side
accepts the other's "right to co-exist" (Kumar, 1999, p. 1). The
peaceful co-existence of both victims and perpetrators of vio-
lence is the goal of reconciliation, achieved through normal-
ized relations (Rosenberg, 1994) that involve both "restoring
dignity to victims" and "dealing respectfully with those who
assisted or were complicit with the violence" (Minow, 1998, p.
23). Stover and Weinstein (2004) prefer social reconstruction or
reclamation to describe restoring safety, rejecting wrongdoing,
and rebuilding communities after violence.
The willingness to 'put up with' people or groups that one
previously was openly hostile towards is an essential ingredi-
ent of reconciliation (Cox & Pawar, 2006; Gibson, 2004; Stover
& Weinstein, 2004). Increased cooperation and mutual toler-
ance through intergroup engagement and dialogue is based
upon the social contact hypothesis of intergroup relations,
which holds that the more people interact, the more likely they
are to tolerate and accept each other. Applying this concept to
post-Apartheid South Africa, Gibson (2004) found that "inter-
racial reconciliation is heavily dependent upon interracial con-
tacts" (p. 20).
Reconciliation does not necessarily entail forgiveness,
which is often criticized as an unrealistic goal following vio-
lence (Kumar, 1999; Minow, 1998; Tutu, 1999). Reconciliation
interventions and TRCs sometimes lead to forgiveness, such
as when a former Apartheid death squad commander was
forgiven by the widows of his victims after he participated in
the South African TRC and apologized (Gobodo-Madikizela,
2003). Despite a significant social psychology literature on
interpersonal conflict and forgiveness (Enright, 2001), little
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attention has been paid to the meaning and process of recon-
ciliation among victims of violence (Androff, 2010a).
Approaches to Reconciliation
Varying approaches differ on how to best achieve recon-
ciliation, ranging from retributive justice, restorative justice,
political, and social justice perspectives. Retributive justice
advocates maintain that reconciliation is a by-product of the
rule of law, and view criminal prosecutions as the best route to
achieving reconciliation (Stover & Weinstein, 2004). Restorative
justice emphasizes repairing the social fabric through media-
tion and dialogue between victims and offenders (Braithwaite,
2002; Umbreit & Armour, 2011), and views reconciliation as a
process of re-humanization necessary to reverse the negative
stereotypes and dehumanization that accompanies violent
conflict (Androff, 2012b; Ajdukovic & Corkalo, 2004; Halpern
& Weinstein, 2004). The political approach defines recon-
ciliation as an exercise in state-building and democratization
(Gibson, 2004). Restoring democratic discourse, supporting
pluralism and diversity, adopting peaceful dispute resolution
and joint participation in communal life are linked to strength-
ening civil society, open elections, and reforming institutions.
Those who argue for compensatory or distributive justice hold
that reconciliation would be best achieved through reparations
and structural changes to the economic system (Minow, 1998).
This perspective recognizes the role of inequality and struc-
tural violence in perpetuating physical violence.
Combining these perspectives and drawing from
Bronfenbrenner and community psychology, Stover and
Weinstein (2004) have proposed an ecological model of social
reconstruction and reconciliation. This systems approach
echoes social work's paradigm of the person-in-environment
perspective (Payne, 2005). Stover and Weinstein (2004) define
their ecological model as "a process that reaffirms and devel-
ops a society and its institutions based on shared values and
human rights" and includes legal, education, economic and in-
tergroup engagement interventions to address the factors that
led to the conflict at the levels of individuals, communities and
the state (p. 5).
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Reconciliation as a Multi-leveled Process
Research by Stover and Weinstein (2004) reveals that social
reconstruction and reconciliation is a slow process, occurs on
multiple levels (individual, community, and state) and is af-
fected by social identity, collective memory, and intergroup
interaction. Daly and Sarkin (2007) also contend that recon-
ciliation occurs on multiple levels ranging from individual
to the international. Androff (2010a) developed a typology of
interpersonal reconciliation that includes cognitive-affective
reconciliation (changes within individuals), behavioral rec-
onciliation (a gesture made by one person towards another),
and social reconciliation (acknowledgment of another's be-
havioral reconciliation resulting in transformed relationships).
Reconciliation also can occur within communities, as former
perpetrators and victims learn to coexist, and within nations,
when people are reconciled with the state following repression
and persecution. International reconciliation refers to peaceful
relations between nations following conflict.
In addition to occurring on multiple levels, reconciliation
is also thought to be a process that unfolds in stages (Maynard,
1999; Stover & Weinstein, 2004). Most stage models of recon-
ciliation and social recovery from violence include the steps of
establishing safety, establishing culturally appropriate modes
of bereavement, restoring trust and morality, and facilitating
dialogue and education. Establishing safety is paramount; rec-
onciliation initiatives often fail if the violent conflict is ongoing
(Hayner, 2001). Bereavement entails cultural mourning prac-
tices of ceremony, art, dance, music, and drama that contrib-
ute to healing (Minow, 1998). Rebuilding trust and morality
includes re-humanizing victims and perpetrators, promoting
empathy, and creating a historical record of the injustices
(Androff, 2012b). Dialogue and education foster critical reflec-
tion on the causes and consequences of the conflict, and work
to cultivate respect and prevent future violence (Freedman et
al., 2004).
TRCs' Contribution to Reconciliation
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are re-
storative justice interventions that investigate human rights
abuses, political repression and violent conflict, and are one of
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the most popular post-conflict interventions for repairing the
social fabric (Androff, 2010b). The truth-seeking function of
TRCs is a narrative process that aims to add victims' stories to
the historical record (Androff, 2012a). The reconciliation func-
tion of TRCs seeks to repair the relationships between victims,
perpetrators and the community. TRCs promote reconcilia-
tion by bringing together perpetrators, victims, and commu-
nity members who may have been witnesses or supporters
of various sides; all are given the opportunity to share their
experiences and engage in dialogue. TRCs also contribute to
reconciliation through public hearings, community mediation
ceremonies, reparations and restitution. These strategies often
incorporate traditional or indigenous models of community
reconciliation and restoration by combining local culture, reli-
gion, and conflict resolution techniques into TRCs. The South
African TRC emphasized an African concept of collectivity,
unbuntu (Hayner, 2001), the Timor-Leste TRC incorporated
animist shamans into local reconciliation ceremonies (Androff,
2008), and the Greensboro TRC worked with Christian church-
es, labor and civil rights leaders (Magarrell & Wesley, 2008).
TRCs must operate in the wider context of social recon-
struction; the social recovery from violence, injustice, and re-
pression is a large context for post-conflict interventions. TRCs
do not constitute a comprehensive intervention for achieving
reconciliation, and should be one tool among many. The GTRC
did not result in total reconciliation in Greensboro, yet was
able to contribute to reconciliation in important ways. TRCs
are best understood as limited mechanisms that can contrib-
ute to a range of broader reconstruction efforts and can ac-
complish certain goals under certain conditions. If these are
clarified, TRCs can be successful interventions in an ecological
framework of post-conflict reconstruction. TRCs play a sig-
nificant role with other social reconstruction efforts, including
legal trials, economic development, education reform, as well
as cultural practices that promote community bereavement,
the re-humanization of social groups, trust building between
groups, and peaceful conflict resolution.
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Methods
This study employed a qualitative design to explore the
perspectives of victims of violence who participated in the
GTRC (n = 17). This is the first study of this population and
their experiences of reconciliation, therefore, an exploratory,
qualitative design is appropriate. In-depth, open-ended in-
terviews allowed for a detailed investigation of victims' per-
spectives on reconciliation. An interview guide was developed
for this research to examine the theme of reconciliation that
elicited background information, such as respondents' demo-
graphics and socio-economic status. Respondents were asked
what reconciliation means to them, if and how they felt the
GTRC addressed reconciliation, how successful the GTRC was
at bringing about reconciliation, and what the limits of recon-
ciliation were in this context. Respondents were encouraged to
express anything they felt was relevant as well as both positive
and negative experiences with the GTRC. Contact information
for victims who participated in the GTRC was obtained from
the GTRC Research Director.
Each participant was first contacted with a letter describ-
ing the research project, and then contacted a week later by
phone for follow up. After securing informed consent, par-
ticipants were offered a small amount of compensation for
their time, $20. Purposive sampling identified seventeen
victims of the 1979 violence who participated in the GTRC.
Interviewing other victims of the violence who choose not to
participate in the intervention was beyond the scope of this
study. Perpetrators and community members were not includ-
ed in this sample, in order to isolate victim's experiences with
reconciliation as a result of their participation in the GTRC.
The absence of perpetrators' perspectives is a limitation of
this research and to understanding the GTRC's contribution
to reconciliation, however, understanding victims' experi-
ences of reconciliation is central to the functioning of TRCs.
For the purpose of this research, the category 'victim' refers
to the survivors of the Greensboro Massacre, including those
shot and stabbed, widows and children of those killed, and
others present who witnessed the violence and could have
been injured. 'Participation in the GTRC' refers to victims who
gave a personal statement in a private interview to a GTRC
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staffer, delivered testimony before a public hearing, and at-
tended GTRC events such as planning meetings, the seating
ceremony of the Commissioners, and the Final Report release
ceremony.
The sample was primarily comprised of the fourteen activ-
ists at the 1979 demonstration as well as three of their children.
In 1979 the demonstrators were in their 20s and 30s, and their
children were either very young or born afterwards; the oldest
of this group was 9. The children, who refer to themselves
as the Second Generation, were included because they met
the sample inclusion criteria as victims and participants; the
oldest was present at the demonstration and the others grew
up deeply affected by the violence as their parents struggled
through the aftermath and each gave a statement to the GTRC
or testified before a public hearing. At the time of the inter-
views, the survivors were in their 50s and 60s, and their chil-
dren in their 20s and 30s. Participants are randomly labeled A-Q
to protect confidentiality. The sample was nearly even between
genders; nine were female and eight male. Respondents self-
identified their ethnicity; seven described themselves as White
and non-Jewish, four described themselves as White and
Jewish, and four identified as African American. Twelve of the
respondents held graduate degrees, two bachelor's degrees,
and three had completed high school but had not attended
college. Interviews averaged two hours, and were recorded,
transcribed, and analyzed in ATLAS.ti qualitative data analy-
sis software. A hermeneutical approach and thematic coding
were used to analyze data to uncover the meaning of recon-
ciliation to victims. Triangulation was employed to verify find-
ings by checking with GTRC staff, accessing the GTRC archive
of statements from the public hearings, and by accessing local
media, such as newspapers and blogs.
Victims' Perspectives on Reconciliation
Respondents' descriptions of their perceptions and expe-
riences with reconciliation reveal insights about what recon-
ciliation means in a local community context. These findings
include respondents' conceptions of reconciliation as a multi-
leveled process, their views of the GTRC's efforts to address
reconciliation, and reservations about its limits. The GTRC
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was a complex intervention, and respondents had positive and
negative assessments of its outcomes. Despite frustration with
its limitations, respondents noted its value, "[the GTRC] is part
of a flawed, but important, process ... people just have to rec-
ognize it for what it is" (B).
Defining Reconciliation
When asked about their conceptions of reconciliation, re-
spondents echoed the lack of consensus in the literature on a
specific definition. Respondent H summed up the problem:
"It's hard to know [what reconciliation is] because we have so
little of it." However, respondents identified two key features
of reconciliation: that it is multi-leveled and is a long term
process.
The multiple levels of reconciliation. Respondents universally
stated that reconciliation occurs on different levels. There can
be many acts of reconciliation. "It's not a wholesale, single
thing" (C). One respondent explained, "I think genuine rec-
onciliation has taken place on a couple levels" (G). The levels
along which reconciliation occurs were identified as micro
and macro reconciliation. Micro-level reconciliation refers to
changes in and between individuals. Macro-level reconcilia-
tion refers to changes between groups of people (perpetrators
and victims, GTRC supporters and critics, African American
and White communities, other minority-majority groups, and
different age and class groups). It is unclear if macro-level rec-
onciliation is the result of many cases of individual reconcili-
ations, or if is more than the accretion of reconciliation on the
micro level. Macro-level reconciliation, played out on a larger
scale than micro-level reconciliation, relates to ongoing efforts
in the community to further the GTRC's work. Macro reconcil-
iation involves "engagement" or getting diverse segments of
the community to come together and participate in the GTRC.
One example of macro reconciliation in the GTRC was that
participants were made up of diverse age groups, specifically
many young people (mainly college students) and older adults
(mainly members of church congregations).
The long term process of reconciliation. In addition to the
multi-level concept, most respondents described reconciliation
as something that happens over a long period of time. In the
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literature, reconciliation is most often conceived of as a process
over time in multiple stages. Respondents indicated that the
GTRC was a "really powerful first step" and "a good first step"
(I) toward reconciliation, though there is still a long way to go.
"I think steps towards [reconciliation] were achieved. I think
it's an ongoing process but I think [the GTRC] is definitely a
good first couple steps towards it" (G). Thus respondents were
positive but cautious, often referring to the GTRC's contri-
bution to reconciliation as the first stage of a longer process
which required more work, "fundamentally I think this is like
the first tiny step in a bigger process," and "I think it was just
more or less a beginning of acknowledging some injustice"
(H). Respondents indicated that the GTRC began the process
of reconciliation by acknowledging diverse perspectives and
important issues, and by promoting dialogue between these
groups.
Respondents were cautious in assessing the GTRC's con-
tribution to reconciliation in Greensboro, which revealed dif-
ferent perspectives on reconciliation. "I think that they helped
it move along. It wasn't like a magic thing, like one day [there
is the GTRC] and the next day [there is reconciliation]" (E).
Respondents also had varying ideas of what the GTRC could
achieve. "I don't think all of the social healing could come
about through the truth and reconciliation process, but I think
that's an important part of it. I'm glad it's happened" (H). As
such, most respondents talked about wanting to see contin-
ued work towards reconciliation. "I hope the process will be
ongoing because that will be [the GTRC's] true legacy-if it
can be promoted and built upon. Otherwise [reconciliation
will be] very limited" (H). This respondent saw the GTRC's
contribution to reconciliation as part of a broader struggle for
social justice.
I view this from the perspective of the struggle
overall-it's not a conclusive phase of the struggle, but
an example of what can be done to move the struggle
forward on the road towards making those changes
that we want to see. (H)
Another respondent voiced that the full meaning of the
GTRC will be revealed in the future, and determined by
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activism. "I think it goes on. If there's going to be any meaning
for Greensboro, it's got to come out in community organiza-
tion and struggle" (M). Ongoing efforts at social change that
stem from a TRC reflect a vision of reconciliation that includes
social justice. This view necessitates that the full measure of
community reconciliation may not be revealed until long after
the completion of the GTRC.
Addressing Reconciliation
Nine respondents felt that the GTRC successfully ad-
dressed reconciliation, and achieved more reconciliation than
they had expected was possible."There's been genuine recon-
ciliation that has gone on, that would not have gone on" (G).
Some were surprised at what the GTRC was able to do, "it was,
in many ways, more than what I expected" (B) and "my ex-
pectations were exceeded" (I). Another respondent said, "I'm
delighted with how it came out. I think [the GTRC] really did
just such a good job" (I). Eight respondents had a more mixed
perspective on what the GTRC accomplished. "The Truth and
Reconciliation process exceeded my expectations and in some
ways, I felt let down, so it was both. It was both more and
less than I had hoped" (B). The primary factors that respon-
dents identified as facilitating the GTRC's success in address-
ing reconciliation were the structure of the intervention and
the stance of neutrality and independence of the community-
based organization.
Respondent C believed that the structure of the GTRC pro-
moted reconciliation. "There was an atmosphere conducive to
people hearing one another's truth, maybe hearing it for the
first time" and stated that "many acts of reconciliation hap-
pened in the course of the Commission's work" (C). She added
that the GTRC "invited reconciliation," that the process had
"reconciliation built into it." Hearing people's stories, espe-
cially listening to the perpetrators, promoted reconciliation.
As C noted, "If you're going to sit and talk, not be shooting
at one another, furthermore, you're going to listen; you're
going to listen respectfully. People are going to have their say,"
which would "promote reconciliation." Another commented
that "I never thought black people and Klan members could
[both participate], but it's being done. It's honest, truthful and
healing ... it's a good process" (D).
Reconciliation
Others emphasized how the neutrality of the GTRC
contributed to its success at reconciliation. The GTRC was
organized so that the victims would not be in control of the
process; this distance earned the GTRC objectivity. People de-
scribed the GTRC as "an open process," and as being "trans-
parent" and thus credible, because "it does draw on so many
different people" (B, I). This independence for the victims was
sometimes "frustrating" when some respondents felt that "[the
victims] weren't having as loud a voice as we wanted" or that
the Commissioners and other participants "were saying things
that I disagreed with," yet many agreed that this was "really
a mark of its value," and "that's part of why it's so good,
because they are so independent and can say things that we
wouldn't agree with." Respondent I added that this ensured
that the GTRC wasn't "just the mouthpiece for Greensboro
Justice Fund or former members of Communist Workers
Party or the Second Generation [of survivors]." Despite the
frustrations, many felt that the GTRC "really was beyond us
and I think that that's part of what made its success." Another
person indicated that the GTRC's objectivity was ensured by
refraining from attacking city agencies. "I think they sought
reconciliation honestly, sincerely. They didn't go around trying
to bash the police" (H).
Limits of Reconciliation
Respondents indicated that the GTRC's constraints and
the overall lack of participation by perpetrators limited the
GTRC's ability to achieve reconciliation. Respondent F felt that
reconciliation was a great idea. "I really love the idea that you
can make [reconciliation] happen, have some healing and get
to a better understanding of what went on," but was poorly ex-
ecuted. "I've not been overly impressed with how this [turned
out]."
Disappointment with the GTRC reflected the conception of
reconciliation as a long-term process. Eight respondents were
disappointed at the reconciliation achieved by the GTRC. "I ex-
pected more," one stated. Another noted, "there is still a long
ways to go" (A, G). Many respondents were skeptical of the
GTRC's contribution to overall reconciliation in Greensboro,
"I had low expectations from the start. I wanted it to work, I
thought it was a great idea, and I was glad someone else was
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trying, but I wasn't going to put any of my time into it" (F). "I
think it is a deafening silence there [on how the Commission
addressed reconciliation]," leading to a negative assessment,
"[It think the impact of the GTRC upon the community has
been minimal" (F).
Some respondents felt the absence of participation by some
perpetrators hampered reconciliation from the outset. "I think
the Commission was limited because the lack of involvement
from the other side," and "the lack of participation by the per-
petrators makes it difficult for it to be a complete reconcilia-
tion" (A). Respondent J added, "I would have liked to have
heard more from the people who didn't like us ... it would
have been nice to have more Klans and Nazis there just to
hear what they had to say." This was disappointing to some
respondents, due to the efforts of the GTRC to reach out to "the
Klansmen, the Nazis, the police department, the public officials
in Greensboro," which "offered them the opportunity to come
forward and tell their story" (H). This was a common com-
plaint raised in terms of achieving a wider reconciliation. "For
the most part they didn't accept that opportunity, the fact that
they didn't accept it probably hurt reconciliation more than
helped it" (H).
Respondents were mixed in their views of the perpetra-
tors that did participate; their differences were a result of their
conceptions of reconciliation. Since most of the perpetrators
didn't participate at all, and the few that did only did so in a
very circumscribed manner, the majority of respondents were
disappointed with this aspect of the GTRC. Several reasons
were cited for this; chief among them was a lack of good-faith
participation of the KKK and Nazi perpetrators, who did
participate in the GTRC but stopped short of acknowledging
their own failures and apologizing. Respondent B described
prerequisites for reconciliation, "there has to be an acknowl-
edgement of wrong-doing and sincere intent to be or do dif-
ferently." They were not satisfied here. "I didn't hear a lot
of that. Most of the people who came forward weren't being
candid, weren't being forthright and didn't honestly want to
acknowledge their wrong-doing." They shared their percep-
tion of what the perpetrators said. "We heard folks who said,
'I wish I hadn't come that day because what happened was I
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ended up in jail for a day."' Others said, "'I didn't know there
was going to be violence."' These statements were made "by
people who brought the guns or organized the guns and knew
there was going to be violence." These respondents' evaluation
of the situation was that "saying, 'I didn't think that there was
going to be violence,' doesn't lay a basis for the word recon-
ciliation," and this prevented "conditions for what I would see
as real reconciliation which would have to come from some
folks who had done some real soul searching." Victims also
described what they would have liked to hear from the perpe-
trators instead: "'I did plan violence. I did come because I was
planning to kill people and these are the people who I talked
to and I really, really wish I hadn't brought that gun and killed
those people."' If they had heard statements to that effect,
more of the victims would have been open to reconciliation,
"then you can talk to me about reconciliation. In the absence of
that it's hard to imagine what that would really look like, for
me" (M).
This failure to fully participate and engage in the GTRC
frustrated many and constituted a significant obstacle to rec-
onciliation that they were not able to overcome. "They've been
able to obscure the situation for decades, for a generation and
a half. So, on the subject of forgiveness, forget it. On the subject
of reconciliation, forget it" (0). B felt that this prevented the
GTRC from working as it was intended, because "the process
itself didn't lend itself to [reconciliation]."
Some respondents gave specific reasons why they thought
the GTRC's efforts at reconciliation were limited, including
media relations, outreach efforts, and insufficient neutrality.
Respondent F was impressed by the only perpetrator who
apologized to two of the victims, and raised the question of
"why wasn't [the apology] a marquee story for our side? Not
just for our side, but for the whole TRC process?" This failure to
publicize even modest successes was seen as a limiting factor
to drawing attention to the reconciliation efforts and a wider
community impact "that was pretty powerful, but I never
heard anybody make anything of it. I never heard anybody
on our side say, 'list that as a good thing. "' This kind of good
press, this respondent felt, could have provided justification
for the process. "You can say that's worth it right there, just to
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have even one guy who was so involved and a shooter [make
an apology]."
Respondent J felt that reconciliation would have been
better served through greater outreach to "more people who
were not so happy with us" and if the GTRC had "some kind
of follow up with ... people that don't like us." Others feared
the victim-centered approach of the GTRC prevented perpe-
trators from being fully engaged in the process. Respondent F
criticized the attitude of the GTRC as "'Oh, sure, we're going
to apologize for what it's clear we did wrong, but basically, we
were the good guys and they were the bad guys."' This was
seen as another obstacle to reconciliation, especially discourag-
ing more perpetrator participation. "I never quite understood
how that proposition was going to be inviting to anyone else,
or how it was going to deal with people in the middle-it's a
question for how TRC's can ever work."
Other respondents described victims that chose not to par-
ticipate in the GTRC and who criticized the process. "There's
been criticism ... that this is no place for a TRC." This person
"hated the idea," of a TRC, "thought it was horrible," and felt
that "to even say it in the same breath as South Africa was
an abomination." Respondent J explained this person's per-
spective by saying, "[one of the demonstrators] is very angry
about the history and doesn't [think the conflict was legitimate
enough to warrant] a TRC."
Respondents cited confusion over the meaning of recon-
ciliation, its nebulous nature and idealistic intentions, as pre-
venting the GTRC from having more of an impact. Respondent
F complained, "I haven't seen an explicit discussion about how
you define it, or the process exactly for getting there? It seemed
a little vague." This seemed especially true as people struggled
to understand how reconciliation works. "From what I've seen,
the plan is: if everybody tells their story, they'll feel better and
they won't be so divided or angry, and there'll be some sort of
implied reconciliation" (F). Four people questioned reconcilia-
tion as a realistic goal in a community characterized by power
inequalities, emphasizing the economic disparities between
the two sides. "It's not a question of two [equal] sides in con-




The GTRC is an example of the popularity and pro-
liferation of reconciliation initiatives, however it is dis-
tinct from previous TRCs as a grassroots-organized and
community-based intervention ata locallevelin a relativelysmall
community context. The victims' lived experiences of recov-
ering from violence and grappling with a community rec-
onciliation intervention contribute to the clarification of the
concept and especially its limitations. However, this research
is limited by several methodological factors. The respondents
were only interviewed after their participation in the GTRC.
In the future, baseline data collected prior to the intervention
should be used to assess participants' expectations of recon-
ciliation interventions and combined with follow up studies.
Also, this study only interviewed the victims that participated
in the intervention; this was a self-selected population. Data
from the victims that elected to not participate could shed light
on further limitations of the GTRC and how it was perceived
in the wider community. Most significantly, research with the
perpetrators that did and did not participate is necessary to
enlarge the picture of the GTRC; future research should attend
to all affected populations in order to assess reconciliation
interventions.
Respondents confirmed the two basic elements of recon-
ciliation found in the literature-that reconciliation is both a
multi-leveled and a long term process. Respondents distin-
guished reconciliation between individuals from reconcilia-
tion between groups, within community, and with the local
city government. They stressed that reconciliation would be
a long term process in Greensboro, and any contribution that
the GTRC may have made is only the first step which needs
to be consolidated and extended. Beyond these core elements,
respondents expressed differences in their conceptualizations
and thus experiences of reconciliation. For respondents who
were generally satisfied with the GTRC, the process contrib-
uted to reconciliation and they accepted that reconciliation
was a practical goal in this setting. They felt that reconcilia-
tion could be accomplished through dialogue; the process of
getting people to talk and respectfully listening to the other
side was seen as instrumental to establishing a measure of
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reconciliation.
However, as noted in the literature, vague definitions
and unrealistic expectations of reconciliation can confound
the implementation of reconciliation projects. Some respon-
dents had difficulty with the concept and were troubled with
the ill-defined nature of reconciliation; others questioned its
appropriateness as a goal. These respondents' understanding
of reconciliation is linked to the goal of social justice and the
transformation of society. It is likely that these expectations
were too high and exceeded the GTRC's capacity to address
and remedy the structural inequalities and injustices of social
life in the U.S. South. Future TRCs may improve the interven-
tion by better defining reconciliation. Clarifying participants'
expectations of reconciliation may lead to more realistic views
of the outcomes. If the process is defined more narrowly, people
and communities may get more out of it. Greater specificity
about the anticipated goals will lend itself to increased pub-
licity and outreach campaigns, and may make reconciliation
efforts more inviting to perpetrators. TRCs are limited inter-
ventions that can overpromise their potential; the very name
of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission may contribute to
unrealistic expectations by proposing that 'truth' exists and
'reconciliation' is achievable. When linked to social justice, the
ideal of reconciliation is better thought of as a valuable process
than an attainable destination. The concrete work of increasing
mutual tolerance by facilitating dialogue and respectful listen-
ing between antagonistic groups is achievable and is a contri-
bution of the GTRC. The willingness to coexist with others in a
diverse society is a building block of peace and social stability;
in this way, TRCs and reconciliation interventions can further
the goal of peace and nonviolent social movements.
The City of Greensboro's opposition to the GTRC was
another obstacle to reconciliation in the community. Some re-
spondents felt that reconciliation was unrealistic in the absence
of those in positions of power in the city. This relates to the
view held by some respondents of the role of social change as
an element of reconciliation. For these respondents, dialogue
that does not lead to social change does not constitute steps
toward reconciliation. Most TRCs have been borne of political
transitions; there was no such transfer of power or change in
the city administration in Greensboro. This hinders the GTRC's
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ability to contribute to social change and limits it impact to the
grassroots level. However, some respondents also felt that the
GTRC had a low community impact, and that further publicity
and outreach efforts would have enhanced its reception by the
general population of Greensboro. Additional resources could
have amplified the GTRC's publicity and outreach efforts.
More attention to framing reconciliation initiatives to maxi-
mize community response and participation could improve
future interventions. The GTRC's lack of official state sanction
is unique among TRCs, however, there were benefits associ-
ated with this independence from government. State imple-
mented reconciliation efforts have been criticized as instru-
ments of political expediency. Some respondents found that
the lack of City support increased the moral authority of the
GTRC. It was a grassroots community sanctioned project-an
exercise in direct democracy and an example of what citizens
can accomplish despite resistance from the government. That
even a few perpetrators participated is testament to the power
of moral suasion of community-based projects.
The GTRC's success at meeting or exceeding some of the
respondents' expectations of reconciliation and engaging some
former perpetrators and victims must be weighed against the
lack of participation by the city and majority of perpetrators.
Their absence was the largest obstacle to reconciliation identi-
fied by respondents. In addition, the contribution of the few
perpetrators who did participate was deemed insufficient by
some respondents, but not all. They viewed the failure of the
perpetrators to take responsibility for their harmful actions as a
major impediment to reconciliation. Reflecting on the failure to
engage the majority of perpetrators, one respondent raised the
question of how the GTRC could have attracted more partici-
pation from perpetrators. A few previous TRCs were endowed
with legal authority to grant perpetrators the participation in-
centive of amnesty or to compel participation; as a grassroots
organization, these measures were beyond the scope of the
GTRC. Further, compelling testimony may lead to dishonest
or self-serving narratives, which may hinder reconciliation in
a different manner. Although the GTRC did implement an in-
clusive process that invited the participation of all community
stakeholders, the goal of full community engagement was not
fulfilled. This indicates that reconciliation will be incomplete
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when all sides do not participate in such interventions.
As an approach to reconciliation, the GTRC was squarely
in the restorative justice perspective. In Greensboro, the retrib-
utive justice approach of prosecutions had failed. The politi-
cal approach was absent from the GTRC without the involve-
ment of the city authorities. The social justice approach of
attending to structural inequality and reparations was beyond
the scope of the GTRC. The need for reparations was perhaps
lessened due to the 1985 civil suit settlement received by the
victims. However, respondents did report that the GTRC was
connected to ongoing efforts to bring about social change in
Greensboro. With its restorative justice approach, the GTRC
facilitated the social contact and engagement of perpetrators
and victims through dialogue and listening to each other's
perspectives. This process restored dignity to the victims and
promoted mutual tolerance and peaceful coexistence. As the
respondents remarked, the feat of having the Klan and dem-
onstrators in the same room without violence was significant.
Despite their differences, both sides were willing to 'put up'
with each other.
A nuanced appreciation for the GTRC's contributions to
reconciliation makes apparent the need to supplement recon-
ciliation efforts with other community interventions working
for social justice. Recalling the ecological model of social re-
covery from violence, a multiplicity of interventions is neces-
sary to rebuild communities. The GTRC has begun the work of
reconciliation in Greensboro, but the project of social transfor-
mation cannot end there.
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